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 Ordoliberalism, Polanyi, 
and the Theodicy of Markets 
 DAVID  M.  WOODRUFF 
 ABSTRACT 
 Though they are seldom paired, there are important points of contact between 
the thought of ordoliberals like Eucken and B ö hm and that of the idiosyncratic 
social democratic theorist Karl Polanyi.  Like Polanyi, the ordoliberals recognised 
the  crucial historical and contemporary role of the state in creating and sustaining 
market economies, and the consequent emptiness of the laissez-faire slogan. Some of 
Polanyi ’ s inter-war analyses of the political use of state power to create monopolies 
show signifi cant parallels with ordoliberal diagnoses. There were points of contact 
in moral perspectives as well: both Polanyi and the ordoliberals emphasised that 
inter-war markets were producing manifestly unjust outcomes, incompatible with 
any notion of desert. Their reactions, of course, were very different. To put it in 
Polanyi ’ s terms, ordoliberals accepted that laissez-faire was planned, and argued 
it needed to be re-planned: more consistently, with the state mobilised to structure 
markets in ways that ensured market earnings refl ected desert. Polanyi, for his part, 
felt that the state structures underpinning any market order made the very idea of 
individual desert unintelligible and a barrier to clear thought about how society 
ought to be organised. This chapter will analyse these parallels and distinctions, 
and discuss the ways in which Polanyi offers signifi cant resources for analysing 
 ordoliberal positions. 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 STARTING IN THE interwar period, ordoliberals sought both to diagnose the failings of classical market liberalism and draw conclusions about what should follow. At the same time, very similar issues preoccupied the idiosyncratic 
social democratic theorist Karl Polanyi. Both Polanyi and the ordoliberals recog-
nised the crucial historical and contemporary role of the state in creating and sus-
taining market economies, and the consequent emptiness of the laissez-faire slogan. 
Their analyses of the political and economic origins of interwar upheavals likewise 
prove to have signifi cant parallels. In moral perspectives, too, there were points of 
216 David M. Woodruff
 1  Among liberals, he mentions, inter alia, Ludwig von Mises, whom Walter Eucken also cites in a simi-
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contact: both Polanyi and the ordoliberals emphasised that interwar markets were 
producing manifestly unjust outcomes. They agreed, in particular, that these out-
comes were incompatible with any notion of desert (understood here and through-
out as what people deserve as a matter of morality). 
 Their reactions to this morally unacceptable circumstance, however, were very 
different. Ordoliberals shared the ideas encapsulated in Polanyi ’ s famous assertion 
that  ‘ [l]aissez-faire was planned ’ . Indeed, the burden of their programme was that 
laissez-faire needed to be re-planned: more consistently, with the state mobilised (and 
constrained) to structure markets in ways that ensured market earnings refl ected 
desert. This sort of  morally appropriate market order, I argue below, was the cen-
tral aim of the reforms in society, economy, and polity that ordoliberals proposed. 
Polanyi, by contrast, rejected the notion of desert as a barrier to clear thought about 
how societies and economies ought to be organised. He argued that because state 
structures underpin any market order, the very idea of individually deserved distri-
butional outcomes under such an order is unintelligible. 
 This chapter seeks to use the contrast between the two projects to bring into sharp 
relief both the enduring moralism of ordoliberalism, and the function of this moral-
ism in the ordoliberal project of replanning laissez-faire. (The reader will already 
have noted that I permit myself to speak of  ‘ ordoliberalism ’ as a coherent whole. 
I believe that there was enough overlap and consistency in ordoliberal thought in 
the period that I discuss, running from the 1930s to the 1950s, that such a collec-
tive reference is justifi ed. In what follows, I draw particularly on Walter Eucken but 
also refer to Alexander R ü stow, Franz B ö hm, and Wilhelm R ö pke). The chapter is 
divided into two sections. In the fi rst, I discuss how Polanyi and the ordoliberals 
analysed the rise and fall of laissez-faire. The second focuses on the ordoliberals ’ 
efforts to replan laissez-faire and how a  ‘ theodicy of markets ’ — an account of how 
the outcomes of properly structured market competition have moral signifi cance —
 became crucial to this effort. 
 II. STATE AND MARKET: TWO ACCOUNTS OF THE  ‘ DOUBLE MOVEMENT ’ 
 The degree to which Polanyi and the ordoliberals can be seen as in implicit dialogue 
with one another is perhaps unsurprising. After all, Polanyi emphasises that his 
account of the rise and fall of what he terms the  ‘ self-regulating market ’ differs from 
that of liberal writers more in interpretation than in historical content. 1 Polanyi 
defi nes the self-regulating market as one in which  ‘ order in the production and distri-
bution of goods is ensured by prices alone ’ , which marked a radical departure from 
prior ways of organising the economy. 2 This price-governed market was not the 
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end-point of an evolutionary process of de-centralised exchange, Polanyi contends, 
but rather the product of a conscious design: an effort to mould an economy  operating 
with the same sort of de-centralised, spontaneous mechanisms that balance popula-
tions of predators and prey. Polanyi sees Joseph Townsend ’ s (1786)  Dissertation 
on the Poor Laws as the crucial programmatic document of this transformation. 
Townsend ’ s deployment of blood-drenched naturalistic metaphors to claim the pres-
tige of science enabled indifference to the massive suffering involved in the move to 
a self-regulating market. 3 
 The origins of this suffering lay in the irreversible damage that market price fl uc-
tuations could do to the  ‘ human and natural components of the social fabric ’ , com-
prising labourers and productive organisations on the human side and land on the 
natural one. The predictable result was  ‘ an urge on the part of a great variety of peo-
ple to press for some sort of protection ’ from the indiscriminate destruction wreaked 
by markets. 4 These protective efforts, he argued, arose spontaneously, in multiple 
contexts and under multiple political banners, prompted by the manifest arbitrari-
ness with which the market economy gouged at the social fabric. Polanyi draws on 
liberal writers for his descriptions of the wave of restrictions on the operation of the 
price mechanism dating from the latter third of the nineteenth century. But whereas 
liberals, he suggests, saw these measures as deriving from the  ‘ sinister interests of 
agrarians, manufacturers, and trade unionists ’ , or a  ‘ collectivist conspiracy ’ , Polanyi 
insisted that they instead represented the  ‘ realistic self-protection of society ’ . 5 By re-
purposing von Hayek ’ s absurdly polemical equation of all efforts to shape or tame 
markets with  ‘ planning ’ , Polanyi is able to sum up his distinctive interpretation in 
epigrammatic form:  ‘ laissez-faire was planned; planning was not ’ . 6 
 Liberals ’ analytical failures, in Polanyi ’ s view, were not limited to misunderstand-
ing the motives underpinning the  ‘ protective countermovement ’ . 7 Polanyi also zeroes 
in on what he sees as liberal hypocrisy regarding the role of the state. As a blueprint 
for constructing a new form of society, one comprehensively subordinated to the 
price mechanism, laissez-faire implied not  ‘ legislative quietism ’ , but state activity 
along a broad front. 8 A paradigm of such state activity was the 1834 Poor Law 
Amendment Act, which did not simply abolish the Speenhamland system of locally 
administered wage support, but created a new system of workhouses under  ‘ dictato-
rial central supervision ’ . 9 Moreover, state activism in the era of the  ‘ self-regulating 
market ’ did not cease with its inception. Polanyi suggests that  ‘ the introduction of 
free markets, far from doing away with the need for control, regulation, and inter-
vention, enormously increased their range. Administrators had to be constantly on 
the watch to ensure the free working of the system ’ . 10 To deny that this watchful 
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 11  ibid, pp 155 – 156. 
 12  Foucault, in fact, offers a summary of the ordoliberals ’ central principle very nearly in these terms: 
 Michel  Foucault ,  The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Coll è ge de France, 1978–1979 , ( Basingstoke : 
 Palgrave Macmillan ,  2008 ), p  116 . Compare  Walter  Eucken ,  ‘ A Policy for Establishing a System of Free 
Enterprise (1952) , ’ in:  Horst  Frierich W ü nsche (ed),  Standard Texts on the Social Market Economy: 
Two Centuries of Discussion , trans.  Derek  Rutter , ( Stuttgart-New York :  Gustav Fischer ,  1982 ), p  116 : 
 ‘ the inception of a viable system of unrestricted competition [should be] the essential criterion of every 
economic measure ’ . 
 13  Eucken, n 1 above, p 27. Making similar points would have strengthened Polanyi ’ s arguments, since 
beyond the Poor Law and the regularisation of the gold standard he is rather vague on the precise ways 
in which the functions of the state were expanded with the rise of laissez-faire. 
 14  ibid, p 28 and 55;  Alexander  R ü stow ,  Das Versagen Des Wirtschaftsliberalismus Als Religions-
geschichtliches Problem , ( Istanbul-Z ü rich-New York :  Europaverlag ,  1945 ),  pp 68 – 69 ;  Walter  Eucken , 
 ‘ Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und Die Krisis Des Kapitalismus ’ , ( 1932 )  36  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv , 
 pp 297 – 321 . 
 15  Eucken, n 1 above, p 28 and 55. While the Eucken makes the latter claim in a somewhat narrower 
context, I believe it to be a fair summary of the broader project in which he is engaged. 
 16  Polanyi, n 1 above, p 117 and 131. 
and active state was engaged in  ‘ intervention ’ was nothing more than sloganeering. 
For instance, rather than interpreting  ‘ laissez faire ’ as implying that workers be left 
undisturbed to organise unions, and businesses to arrange cartels, liberals advo-
cated forbidding both.  ‘ The only principle economic liberals can maintain without 
 inconsistency is that of the self-regulating market, whether it involves them in inter-
ventions or not ’. 11 
 Here was a conclusion with which ordoliberals could have fervently agreed. 
Indeed, their programme could almost be summarised as discovering and defend-
ing the precise state interventions required to maintain the self-regulating market. 12 
Their reading of the rise and fall of laissez-faire served as both justifi cation for this 
project and its evidentiary base. On the key turning-points and empirical devel-
opments, they were in broad agreement with Polanyi. Thus, even at the outset, 
according to Eucken, laissez-faire did not in the least involve a  ‘ stateless economy ’ . 
Instead, it was  ‘ in precisely this [ laissez-faire ] period [that] the state created strict 
laws  governing property, contracts, corporations, and so on ’ . 13 They likewise see the 
latter part of the nineteenth century as dominated by a wave of policies that pushed 
back against the hegemony of the price mechanism. 14 Finally, the ordoliberals shared 
with Polanyi the view that features of classical market liberalism itself prompted 
the policies that undermined it. Imagining laissez-faire as a  ‘ lost paradise ’ would 
hinder efforts to learn from it. The spiritual successors of classical liberals must seek 
to understand why  ‘ the implementation of the principle of  laissez-faire unleashes 
 tendencies to its revocation [ Aufhebung ] ’ . 15 
 Despite these parallels, the ordoliberals ’ analysis of precisely why laissez-faire 
contained the seeds of its own destruction naturally diverges sharply from Polanyi ’ s. 
The divergence starts with their distinct readings of the key doctrinal origins of 
laissez-faire. Polanyi, as noted above, highlights the importance of Townsend, and 
dismisses the role of Adam Smith; Smith ’ s  ‘ broad optimism ’ that  ‘ the laws governing 
the economic part of the universe are as consonant with man ’ s destiny as are those 
that govern the rest ’ , was not of the sort that could have justifi ed the indifference to 
human suffering necessary to launch the self-regulating market. 16 For  ordoliberals 
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 17  Eucken, n 1 above, pp 27 – 28; R ü stow, n 14 above, pp 15 – 28. For the quote, taken here out of 
context but hopefully not unfairly so, see ibid, 40. See  Alexander  R ü stow ,  ‘ Appendix ’ , in:  Wilhelm  R ö pke 
(ed),  International Economic Disintegration , ( London :  William Hodge and Company ,  1942 ), p  271 . 
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 19  Eucken, n 1 above, pp 49 – 50. 
 20  R ü stow, n 14 above, p 1. 
 21  Eucken, n 12 above, p 125;  Ralf  Ptak ,  ‘ Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foun-
dations of the Social Market Economy ’ , in:  Philip  Mirowski and  Dieter  Plehwe (eds),  The Road From 
Mont P è lerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective , ( Cambridge  MA :  Harvard University 
Press ,  2009 ), p  1443 . 
 22  Franz B ö hm,  ‘ Left-wing and Right-wing Approaches to the Market Economy (1953) ’ , in: W ü nsche 
(ed), n 12 above, p 364. 
such as Eucken and R ü stow, however, Smith ’ s infl uence was decisive — and that 
his theory was  ‘ pronouncedly optimistic ’ was, in fact, a key weakness of classical 
market liberalism. 17 Smith ’ s belief that the market was implicit in divinely ordained 
human nature meant that little thought needed to be devoted to the market ’ s institu-
tional pre-conditions and prevented him from giving a systematic account of these. 18 
 The idea of freedom under the rule of law, which ordoliberals identifi ed as a 
second ideological cornerstone of laissez-faire, likewise could not serve as a fi ghting 
creed when the self-regulating market was challenged. 19 The characteristic stance 
of classical liberalism was to assume that, having created the legal framework for a 
market economy, no further state action was necessary. 
 Thus, the ordoliberals held, when challenges to the price mechanism emerged, a 
legalistic and theologically infl ected classical liberalism did not offer an ideological 
apparatus capable of justifying and organising a vigorous defence against them. As 
R ü stow put it: 
 The social and political catastrophe of economic liberalism was, in essence, a result of the 
absolutism with which it implemented its maxim of  ‘ laissez faire, laissez passer ’ , in which 
it had placed so much stock. 20 
 Such passivism was insuffi cient, in particular, to deal with the efforts of interest 
groups to subvert market competition. These could happen either through taking 
advantage of the opportunities offered by liberal law — for instance, the use of free-
dom of contract to uphold cartels — or through pushes for anti-competitive legisla-
tion, which a democratic state could do little to resist. 21 Ordoliberals spared no 
passion in excoriating such attempts to escape the strictures of the market economy. 
Here is a representative example from Franz B ö hm: 
 What confronts us here is  … a general rebellion of the broadest sections of those engaged 
in the economy, whether they are supporters, or critics, or opponents of the market system, 
who, at least when it comes to their own personal interests, are prepared to demand that 
the market system can go to hell so that special rules of the game, and a special slice of the 
cake, shall be cooked up for them, contrary to market principles. The agents in this process 
of anarchic disintegration are countless: workers against entrepreneurs, consumers, and 
the owners of land and capital; entrepreneurs against workers, consumers, and those not 
remunerated through markets; bureaucrats for their own vested interests against all other 
vested interests; one sector against all others; agriculture against the rest of the economy; 
one trade against every other possible interest. 22 
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 Such rhetoric might seem little different from the invocations of the  ‘ sinister interests 
of agrarians, manufacturers, and trade unionists ’ that Polanyi had ascribed to the 
broader liberal school. Yet, the ordoliberals were not entirely blind to the issues that 
prompted Polanyi to speak instead of the  ‘ realistic self-protection of society ’ . 23 In a 
passage with deliberate echoes of Karl Marx, Walter Eucken writes: 
 There were free contracts of employment, freedom of movement and guarantees for private 
property. But whereas people ’ s freedom and equality of status appeared secure in political 
and legal terms, industrial workmen were not in fact free either economically or socially. 
In their dependence and search for an easily identifi able target, workers saw themselves as 
being at the mercy of the  “ omnipotence of capital ” . 24 
 Workers ’ lack of practical freedom arose from a situation of monopsony on labour 
markets. 25 Anti-capitalist attitudes, then, stemmed in part not from capitalism itself, 
but from the congenital inability of laissez-faire doctrines to protect the kind of com-
petitive circumstances whose consequences they extolled. Indeed, Polanyi  himself 
could have served as an excellent example for this argument. In the 1920s, his jus-
tifi cation for his advocacy of replacing capitalism with guild socialism included 
the complaint that, under capitalism,  ‘ income from work does not necessarily 
correspond to the effort and burden of labor, nor to services and utility. Instead, work 
incomes are often determined by monopolies enjoyed by traditional social groups 
[ St ä nde ] or individuals, or those created by transient economic circumstances ’ . 26 
 Whatever discontent workers, or, for that matter, businesses felt over their 
 fortunes in the market economy, this could only be translated into political action if 
some ideas legitimated this action. This brings us to a fi nal element of the ordoliber-
als ’ analysis of the downfall of laissez-faire. If it was an inconsistently implemented 
market economy that left workers disadvantaged, why would they not champion 
the restoration of market competition rather than state action curtailing it ? Eucken 
claimed that, given that even the imperfect market of the late nineteenth century had 
improved workers ’ material situation, the roots of anti-capitalist sentiment needed 
to be sought elsewhere. 27 In fact, these roots lay in shifting moral and religious atti-
tudes. In an argument with some distant echoes of Max Weber ’ s  ‘ Protestant Ethic ’ 
thesis, Eucken suggested religion ’ s waning capacity  ‘ to provide a meaningful context 
for life and thus economic action too ’ gave rise to  ‘ faith  … in a total, all-controlling 
state ’ as a  ‘ substitute for religion ’ . Where once  ‘ man had accepted economic misfor-
tune as fate ’ ,  ‘ today the farmer, like the employee and the worker, is inclined to make 
the contemporary state responsible for [this misfortune] and to demand help from 
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it as a self-evident right ’ . 28 R ü stow highlighted the role of the doctrinal failings of 
laissez-faire in such a context: 
 Instead of being frank about the fact that the extraordinary chances of gain which the game 
of the market economy offers for the good players are accompanied by chances of loss for 
those who are less capable or less fortunate, and that all those who want to participate in 
this game are obliged to take their chance, the [classical liberal] propaganda promised pros-
perity and happiness to all without exception.  … The result in this case was that a type of 
player was bred, particularly in countries where the hardening tradition of Calvinism was 
non-existent, who enjoys playing a game only as long as he wins, but who, the moment 
he begins to lose, runs off in a huff and refuses to continue playing. This behaviour of the 
bad loser could be observed in the attitude of many entrepreneurs who went begging to the 
government to protect them against even the smallest losses. 29 
 What laissez-faire lacked, in this light, was some sort of functional substitute for 
Calvinism ’ s  ‘ hardening tradition ’ . 
 To recapitulate: the two crucial differences between Polanyi ’ s and the ordoliberals ’ 
accounts of the rise and fall of the automatic price mechanism concerned, on the one 
hand, its doctrinal roots, and, on the other, the motivations of those who demanded 
its limitation. These distinctions were linked. For Polanyi, laissez-faire was an effort 
to institutionalise disregard for human suffering by aping Nature ’ s vast indifference: 
an  ‘ act of vivisection performed on the body of society by such steeled to their task 
by an assurance which only science can provide ’ . 30 Society ’ s self-defence was only to 
be expected, and contribution to the repair of the social fabric was a crucial driver 
of the success of classes in political struggle. 31 For the ordoliberals, laissez-faire was 
an effort to implement Smith ’ s vision of  ‘ natural liberty ’ under the rule of law, but 
one which, because of its reliance on a divine dispensation, did not  ‘ steel ’ its advo-
cates to its defence. The emergence of self-interested enemies of market competition 
indicated not the essential viciousnesses of the doctrine, but challenges with which 
laissez-faire had failed to grapple. 
 III. REPLANNING LAISSEZ-FAIRE: THE THEODICY OF MARKETS 
 In sum, surveying the history of laissez-faire, the ordoliberals concluded that it 
had not been planned thoroughly enough: it needed to be planned again, this time 
focusing on the problem of how best to defend market competition and the price 
mechanism from the forces that could undermine them. The spirit of this endeavour 
emerges very clearly in the 1937 essay entitled  ‘ Our tasks ’ , a vigorous technocratic 
manifesto calling on lawyers and economists to take on the task of promoting free 
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competition. 32 In this section of this chapter, I wish to defend the thesis that the 
ordoliberals ’ solution to the challenges that they set themselves relied crucially on 
notions of desert. What they sought to construct was a market economy in which 
commercial success would refl ect praiseworthy qualities, so that those who fl our-
ished in the market would have deserved to do so. This idea of a morally satisfying 
market order — a market order of which it would be possible to give a theodicy in the 
Weberian sense, which I shall describe below — served to unify and motivate different 
parts of the ordoliberal agenda. 
 Polanyi, in fact, can offer us a powerful insight into why the ordoliberals ’ ambi-
tions to design a heavily-armored version of Smithian liberalism drew them to ideas 
of desert. In the fi nal chapter of  The Great Transformation , he suggested that: 
 Liberal economy gave a false direction to our ideals. It seemed to approximate the 
fulfi llment of intrinsically utopian expectations. No society is possible in which power and 
compulsion are absent, nor a world in which force has no function.  … Yet this was the 
result of a market view of society which equated economics with contractual relation-
ships, and contractual relations with freedom.  … Vision was limited by the market which 
 “ fragmentated ” life into the producers ’ sector that ended when his product reached the 
market, and the sector of the consumer for whom all goods sprang from the market. The 
one derived his income  “ freely ” from the market, the other spent it  “ freely ” there. Society 
as a whole remained invisible. The power of the state was of no account, since the less its 
power, the smoother the market mechanism would function. Neither voters, nor owners, 
neither producers, nor consumers could be held responsible for such brutal restrictions of 
freedom as were involved in the occurrence of unemployment and destitution. Any decent 
individual could imagine himself free from all responsibility for acts of compulsion on the 
part of a state which he, personally, rejected; or for economic suffering in society from 
which he, personally, had not benefi ted. He was  “ paying his way ” , was in  “ nobody ’ s debt ” , 
and was unentangled in the evil of power and economic value. His lack of responsibility for 
them seemed so evident that he denied their reality in the name of his freedom. 33 
 Polanyi here proposes a relationship of mutual defi nition between the notion of 
morally praiseworthy market fl ourishing — the ideal of the individual  ‘ paying his 
way ’ and being  ‘ in nobody ’ s debt ’ — and that of  ‘ free ’ action on a market. Only if 
consumers and producers are free to choose their actions can they be held respon-
sible for their consequences. American legal realists and institutional economists, 
on whom Polanyi certainly drew here, resoundingly demonstrated that contractual 
relationships can  not be equated with a kind of freedom implying the absence of 
compulsion. 34 The crux of the legal realist/institutional economist argument is easy 
to illustrate: contracts involve the exchange of property rights, and property itself 
rests on the threat of state compulsion to protect assets from those who do not 
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 35  An outstanding survey can be found in  Barbara  Fried ,  The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: 
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own them. 35 Polanyi concluded, in effect, that in the light of the emptiness of the 
liberal ideal of freedom, both it and the associated notion of desert needed to be 
abandoned. 
 Ordoliberals, by contrast, placed the idea of economic freedom as non-compulsion 
at the very heart of the market liberal order that they hoped to construct, and found 
themselves mobilising notions of desert as a key buttress of this order. 36 Certainly, 
desert was not the sole defensive emplacement. To protect economic freedom from 
the processes that had undermined it in the nineteenth century, ordoliberals focused 
on both constraining the ability of the state to  supply policies that would empower 
monopolists or otherwise undermine competition, and on reducing the inclination 
of businesses and individuals to  demand them. The key  ‘ supply ’ constraints were 
contained in the well-known notions of the  ‘ economic constitution ’ and  ‘ ordering 
policy ’ [ Ordnungspolitik ] which were intended to limit the state to establishing the 
legal framework for a competitive economy while preventing interference with its 
outcomes. The purpose of this approach was to insulate the state from the demands 
of both the masses and what B ö hm had termed the  ‘ exploiting gangs ’ seeking to 
force consumers to pay higher prices. 37 Polanyi had suggested that the  ‘ crudest ver-
sion ’ of the liberal interpretation of the double movement was  ‘ an attack on political 
democracy, as the alleged mainspring of interventionism ’ , and he might well have 
analysed the ordoliberal demand for a  ‘ strong ’ state empowered to ignore calls to 
interfere with the price mechanism in this vein. 38 As for the  ‘ demand ’ side, one tactic, 
ably discussed by Michel Foucault, was an effort to devise ways to diffuse the capac-
ity for competition through society. 39 
 Both the supply-side measures insulating the state and demand-side measures 
 diffusing competitive capacities represented instances of the ordoliberals ’ determina-
tion to transcend the confusions and hypocrisies of the term  ‘ interventionism ’ that 
Polanyi diagnosed by making the preservation of competitive markets, rather than 
laissez-faire, the principle from which state structure and policy were to be derived. 
As Eucken recognised, this focus on competition detached the ordoliberal legitima-
tion of markets from  ‘ natural law or the higher plane of dogmatic axioms ’ . 40 But if 
natural law or other moral postulates were to be set aside in favour of the competi-
tive market as the ultimate yardstick of political morality, this forcefully posed the 
question of what guaranteed the legitimacy of such a market. Note that the ques-
tion is not merely one of economic effi ciency. The ordoliberals do not, for instance, 
make the common claim that, because competitive markets generate the most social 
wealth, they can be used to fund any distributive outcomes that society wishes to 
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achieve — an argument that explicitly views markets as a means to an end. Similarly, 
although ordoliberals do provide arguments for the effi ciency of competitive mar-
kets compared to planned economies, these offer no grounds for affi rming competi-
tive markets ’ status as a moral axiom from which constitutional conclusions could 
be drawn. 
 To understand how the ordoliberals resolved the issue of the market ’ s moral 
standing — which they probably grasped more intuitively than explicitly, but defi -
nitely grasped nonetheless — it is helpful to turn briefl y to Max Weber. As noted 
above, the ordoliberal analysis of the degeneration of laissez-faire implicitly asserted 
a descendent of Weber ’ s  ‘ Protestant Ethic ’ thesis: with a state constitutionally inca-
pable of defending the competitive market from the self-interested acts of those who 
would undermine it, the survival of competition depended on the willingness of 
competition ’ s losers to accept this outcome as  ‘ fate ’ . To the extent that a belief in pre-
destination could facilitate such acquiescence to market outcomes, its waning would 
not only heighten  ‘ demand side ’ pressures for a turn against self-regulating markets, 
but also deny the outcomes produced by such a market regarding any particular 
moral standing. In his later work, Weber situated the  ‘ Protestant Ethic ’ analysis in 
the broader context of a  ‘ very general [psychological] need ’ to regard one ’ s fortune 
as justifi ed. He argued: 
 The fortunate is seldom satisfi ed with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to 
know that he has a  right to his good fortune. He wants to be convinced that he  “ deserves ” 
it, and above all, that he deserves it in comparison with others. He wishes to be allowed the 
belief that the less fortunate also merely experience[s] his due. Good fortune thus wants to 
be  “ legitimate ” fortune. ’ 41 
 More recent psychological research has supported Weber ’ s claim. There is a wide-
spread  ‘ belief in a just world ’ , summarised by Roland B é nabou and Jean Tirole as 
 ‘ the nearly universal human tendency to want to believe that people generally get 
what they deserve ’ . 42 
 For Weber, this desire to experience oneself as morally worthy is an example 
(indeed, the prime example) of an  ‘ ideal interest ’ . To address this ideal interest, one 
needs what Weber terms an  ‘ ethical interpretation of the  “ meaning ” of the distri-
bution of fortunes among men ’ , 43 or, more compactly, a  ‘ theodicy ’ . 44 He argues 
that this need imparts a powerful impulse to the development of religious doctrine, 
and that these doctrines in turn have important effects on action.  ‘ Not ideas, but 
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material and ideal interests, directly govern men ’ s conduct. Yet very frequently the 
 “ world images ” that have been created by  “ ideas ” have, like switchmen, determined 
the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of [material and 
ideal] interest ’ . 45 The  ‘ Protestant Ethic ’ thesis is an example of this dynamic. Calvin-
ists ’ ideal interest in belief in their moral worth became, in their religious context, 
the need to achieve certainty of salvation, which set them on the track to vigorous 
worldly actions that they could interpret as evidence that they were among the elect. 
 Calvinism, then, offered in Weber ’ s rendering a kind of  ‘ theodicy of markets ’ , a 
means of reconciling market outcomes with morality in an emotionally resonant 
way. For the ordoliberals, a successful theodicy of markets would offer two benefi ts. 
First, it might serve as a substitute for Calvinism ’ s  ‘ hardening tradition ’ , blunting 
critiques of the outcomes of market competition and defending the price mechanism. 
Second, and more signifi cantly, defending the moral standing of market competition 
would justify its elevation to the sort of principle around which one might legiti-
mately structure a polity. 
 In this light, it is perhaps not surprising to fi nd the ordoliberals repeatedly assert-
ing that a competitive market economy would allocate rewards in line with moral 
desert. Some telling examples of this implicit legitimation strategy can be found 
in Eucken ’ s discussion of macroeconomic issues, where moral claims serve to but-
tress tenuous assertions about the relationship between the microeconomic and 
 macroeconomic levels of analysis. For instance, discussing infl ation, Eucken seeks to 
establish that  ‘ all efforts to translate a system for regulating competition into reality 
are fruitless until a certain stability in the value of money has been ensured ’ . 46 This 
is so, he argues, because infl ation reduces liabilities while increasing sales, which 
 ‘ results in profi ts from infl ation instead of from  the skilful [zutreffenden] direction of 
the economic process [emphasis added] ’ . 47 A parallel problem occurs with defl ation. 
With stable prices, then, it is skill that drives profi t, and without this there is no true 
competition. This should be regarded as an implicitly moralised defi nition of what 
competition is — its absence is recognised by  undeserved profi ts. Note, in particular, 
that this argument relies on the moral standing of liabilities — without this implicit 
claim, one could equally make the argument that funding a business via debts sub-
sequently made lighter by infl ation could be regarded as a display of far-sighted 
business virtuousity. 
 A second area in which the ordoliberals ’ moralisation of the market is apparent is 
in their treatment of liability. Eucken asserts: 
 Those who are accountable for the plans and measures adopted by businesses, factories and 
private families must be accountable in law (the liability principle). 48 
 Certainly, some of the reasoning mobilised to defend this principle is detached from 
any direct moral considerations. Eucken argues that liability ensures that markets 
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can promote  ‘ natural selection of enterprises and of managers ’ , in so far as it elimi-
nates those who cannot compete. He also sees limited liability as a temptation to 
economic concentration, because it makes available larger profi ts without the cor-
responding risk. But his is not solely an ethically neutral, incentive-based argument. 
Consider, for instance, the following: 
 As  R ö pke has pointed out, the competitive system presupposes  “ that the attainment of 
profi tability will only be possible by means of an equivalent economic achievement [ Leis-
tung ], while at the same time it must be ensured that a blunder [ Fehlleistung ] will fi nd its 
inexorable atonement [ S ü hne ] in losses and fi nally in exclusion via bankruptcy from the 
ranks of those responsible for production. Steps must be taken to prevent both the devious 
enjoyment of income without a corresponding achievement and the non-atonement for 
blunders by passing on the losses to others ” . 49 
 Again, we have the link of profi tability to achievement, and now the need to  ‘ atone ’ 
for errors. Others should not suffer for mistakes not their own. The supposed func-
tional pre-requisites of market competition are conveyed in a language saturated 
with moral overtones. A properly regulated market is thus fi gured as a  morally 
meaningful universe, in which good fortune is legitimate good fortune. 
 The desire to see profi ts refl ect praiseworthy behaviour can also be found in the 
ordoliberal analysis of the dangers of restricting competition, developed especially by 
B ö hm. Non-competitive orders face a  ‘ moral danger ’ because  ‘ entrepreneurs are ena-
bled to determine the size of their income and profi t by means of price-setting ’ . 50 By 
contrast,  ‘ competition forms the moral backbone of a free profi t-based economy ’ . 51 
The line between immoral and moral earnings is traced by the famous distinction 
between  ‘ Leistungswettbewerb ,  “ achievement ” or  “ performance competition ”  … as 
opposed to  Behinderungswettbewerb ,  “ prevention competition ” , ie competition by 
means that are directed at preventing competition from other producers rather than 
improving one ’ s own performance ’ . 52 
 IV. CONCLUSION 
 A compact way of conveying the parallels and distinctions in the way Polanyi and 
the ordoliberals reacted to the rise and fall of the self-regulating market is to consider 
their analyses of Britain ’ s abandonment of the gold standard in 1931. Eucken sug-
gested that this occurred  ‘ not due to an internal failure of the well-known classical 
gold-standard mechanism, but rather because the state-society setting [ Umgebung ] 
the gold-standard mechanism required had been destroyed ’ . 53 Polanyi would not 
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have disagreed in the least: both saw that democracy, re-inforcing workers ’ ability to 
defend their wages despite international trade defi cits, meant that the gold-standard 
adjustment mechanism could not function. 54 The distinction lay in the lessons to 
be drawn. Eucken and the ordoliberals saw this as a failing of the  ‘ state-society 
setting ’ , which they proposed to re-construct to protect the market from political 
interference, limiting democracy while fostering a kind of society capable of sustain-
ing competition. Polanyi, by contrast, saw the self-regulating market as a utopian 
and destructive ideal, and state and society ’ s reaction to the market ’ s  ‘ disembedding ’ 
as inevitable. 
 This chapter has endeavoured to show that the comparison between Polanyi and 
the ordoliberals reveals how an effort to give market outcomes a moral standing was 
a crucial prop for the ordoliberal position. The present author fi nds Polanyi ’ s rejec-
tion of the logical coherence of this project convincing. But it is worth considering 
the extent to which the ordoliberals ’ readiness to provide a theodicy of markets con-
tributed to their long-term political success. Polanyi believed that it was simply the 
misconceptions of the classical liberals that gave  ‘ a false direction to our ideals ’ . 55 
But if Weber ’ s view of the emotional power of the ideal interest in viewing one ’ s 
economic fortunes as legitimate is correct, the roots of the dilemma go far deeper. 
 
 

